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Ho de diôkei men hapasa psychê kai toutou heneka panta 
prattei1 
Rafael Ferber 
University of Lucerne / University of Zurich 
 As we all know, ho de diôkei men hapasa psychê kai toutou heneka panta prattei 
(R.505d11-e1) is in the Republic the idea or form of the Good (R.508e2-3.517b8-9). The 
platonic Socrates calls it also “that what the Good itself is” (532b1) or “the Good itself” 
(534c4.540a8-9) or simply “the Good” (R.509b7.519c10). It is also the megiston mathêma 
(R.509a5.519c9-10), that is, “the greatest thing to be learned” or “the greatest lesson”. In the 
last ten years or so, this greatest thing has found enormous attention in the Plato scholarship.2 
Alas, we may not only say with the platonic Socrates “… that there are many large con-
troversies (amphisbêtêseis) about this” (R.505d2), that is, the Good. There are also many and 
large controversies about the correct interpretation of what the platonic Socrates did say about 
the Good. The problem is by no means the scarcity of literature, but that there is so much 
literature on this topic. The consequence is that possibly nobody can be sure of not saying 
something which has been said before and perhaps already long ago been refuted. The only 
means to make some progress in understanding, if possible, is to pay close attention to the 
text and to make our interpretations so sharp that they can be refuted. In the following, I do 
not enter directly into the question “What in fact is the Good?”, but I first (I) give an exegesis 
of the famous preliminary passage 505d11-506a2. Then (II) I attempt to show that we can 
elucidate some dark points in its meaning with the help of Aquinas before I try to find (III) an 
uncontroversial starting point for a correct interpretation of the idea of the Good instead of 
advancing a new one. 
I. 
The passage R. 505d1-506a2 is one sentence depending on the relative pronoun ho.3 
Nevertheless, I divide it for the sake of clarity into six subsentences: 
 
“[S1] Ho dê diôkei men hapasa psychê kai toutou heneka panta prattei 
[S2] apomanteuomenê ti einai 
[S3] aporousa de kai ouk echousa labein hikanôs ti pot’ estin 
[S4] oude pistei chrêsasthai monimôi hoiai kai peri talla 
                                                             
1 My sincere thanks go to Lesley Brown, Rachana Kamtekar, Nicholas Smith and Roslyn Weiss for 
some helpful remarks. All errors are my own. 
2 Cf. F. Ferrari (2003); Szlezák (2003b), Vegetti (1998-2007 V); Dixsaut (2005); Ferber (2003b), 
(2005); Lisi (2007a), 10-30; Penner (2005), (2007a, b, c); Rowe (2007a), (2007c), (2007d); Seel (2007). 
The main contributions of the last century are listed in the bibliographies of Lafrance, (1987), esp. 176-
188; Brisson (1999), (2004b); Erler (2007). Cf. for an overview Fronterotta (2010b), 143-146. 
3 I owe this observation to Dimitri El Murr, here.  
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[S5] dia touto de apotynchanei kai tôn allôn ei ti ophelos ên, 
[S6] peri de to toioûton kai tosoûton houtô phômen dein eskotôsthai kai ekeinous tous 
beltistous en tê polei hois panta encheirioumen;”(R.505d11-506a2). 
 
“[S1] What every soul pursues and for what it does whatever it does,  
[S2] divining that it is something, 
[S3] but is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is  
[S4] or acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things,  
[S5] and so it misses the benefit, if any, that even those other things may give,  
[S6] will we allow the best people in the city, to whom we entrust everything, to be so in 
the dark about something of this kind and of this importance?” (Tr. Georges M. A. Grube, 
revised by C. D. C. Reeve and with modifications by R. F.). 
 
[S1] The first sentence states that the Good is what every soul pursues and for what it 
does whatever it does. We may safely assume that the platonic Socrates implies that “every 
human soul pursues the Good and does whatever it does for it”, since only human souls can 
“divine that it is something (ti einai)”.  
But what does it mean that every human soul does everything for the Good, that is, the 
idea of the Good? Here we have two options of translation. Every human soul “goes to all 
lengths” for the sake of the Good. The sentence has already been translated in this way by the 
Italian Francesco Gabrieli and the German Wilhelm Wiegand. Gabrieli translates: “O quella 
cosa che ogni anima persegue e per cui fa ogni sforzo” (my emphasis).4 Wiegand translates: 
“In betreff also des eigentlichen Guten, wonach jede Menschenseele strebt und dessentwegen 
sie alle Anstrengungen unternimmt” (my emphasis).5 Otto Apelt translates in the same vein 
by giving panta prattein a negative twist: “Eine jede Seele also strebt dem Guten nach und 
lässt um seinetwillen nichts ungetan” (my emphasis).6 Explicitly, this translation of panta 
prattein with “to go to all lengths” has been defended by Terry Irwin.7 But panta prattein can 
also be translated literally that every human soul does everything for the sake of the Good. 
The majority of translators take this route.  
These different translations have different consequences: If every human soul does every-
thing for the sake of the Good, each soul — if she does bad things — does bad things for the 
sake of the Good. Then the platonic Socrates of the 6th book seems to reassume the “intellec-
tualistic doctrine” of the platonic Socrates of the Meno (cf.78b1-2), Protagoras (cf.358c6-d2), 
and Gorgias: “Hence it’s for the sake of what’s good that those who do all these things do 
them” (Grg.468b7-8), namely, “put a person to death, … or banish him and confiscate his 
property” (Grg. 468b4-6. Transl. Zeyl). If we prefer the literal translation, then we have also 
in the 6th book of the Republic the Socratic doctrine that nobody willingly does wrong be-
cause he does everything for the Good. 
If, on the contrary, every human soul “goes to all lengths” or leaves nothing undone for 
the Good, then every human soul can also be overthrown just “in consequence of an im-
pulse”8 not to do everything for the Good. In this case, the platonic Socrates of the Republic 
would distance himself with his introduction of the tripartite soul from the platonic Socrates 
                                                             
4 Gabrieli (1981), 234. 
5 Wiegand (1940), 239. 
6 Apelt (1923), 259. 
7 Irwin (1977), 336, n. 45: “The description of the Good as ‘what every soul pursues and for the 
sake of which does everything’ (panta prattei, 505e1) conflicts with the anti-Socratic view of Book IV if 
‘does everything’ means ‘does everything that it does’. But it can also mean ‘go to all lengths’. [---]. 
Plato allows then the existence of incontinence”. 
8 Prichard (2002), 33. 
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of the Gorgias. This is a theory which goes back to Eric R. Dodds and has been reformulated 
by Gregory Vlastos, Donald Davidson, Terry Penner, Christopher Rowe, Myles Burnyeat, 
and others.9 
But also in the story of Leontios of the 4th book, desire itself seems not to be completely 
blind. It is, rather, a desire which is based on a doxa.10 Certainly Leontios is “overpowered by 
the appetite” (kratoumenos d’oun hypo tês epithumias) (R.440a1). It is a case of akrasia. 
However, he “pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying” (R.440a1-
2): “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!” (kalou 
theamatos) (R.440a2-3) (Transl. Grube). The eyes of Leontios see the cadavers as beautiful. 
The object of the sight is not an uninterpreted datum of observation. The sight (theama) is 
accompanied by an explicit doxa and value judgment. It is from the point of view of Leontios’ 
epithymia a beautiful sight to see the cadavers because Leontios’ epithymia may have “a 
sexual interest in pale youths”.11 But what is beautiful or fine is also in some sense good, 
namely, pleasurable, at least for the appetitive part. Of course, the expression “kalon” may be 
taken ironically from Leontios’ reason and means the contrary, namely, “aischron”.12 It is, 
for reason, ugly to see the cadavers, whereas it is beautiful or pleasurable for the appetitive 
part. But just in the moment of acting, Leontios acts driven by his epithymia against his better 
second-order value judgment in accordance with the first-order value judgment “of his 
wretched eyes”. They see as kalon what is aischron and are therefore in error. In this sense, 
Leontios’ appetite is not simply a bodily or good-independent sensation like an itch (sexual), 
but a good-dependent desire dependent on an implicit if erroneous judgment with a proposi-
tional structure on what is good.13 Sure, Leontios “had at the same time an appetite to look at 
them but at the same time he was disgusted” (hama men idein epithymoi, hama de au 
dyscherainei) (R.439e9). In the terminology of Harry Frankfurt: Leontios had at the same 
time a “first-order-desire” to look at the corpses and a “second-order-desire” which opposes 
his “first-order-desire”.14 He has synchronic opposite desires although he does not perform 
synchronic opposite actions. But since synchronic opposite actions would presuppose syn-
                                                             
9 Cf. Dodds (1951), 213: “The theory of inner conflict, vividly illustrated in the Republic by the tale 
of Leontios, was precisely formulated in the Sophist, where it is defined as psychological maladjustment 
resulting ‘from some sort of injury’, a kind of disease of the soul, and is said to be the cause of coward-
ice, intemperance, injustice, and (it would seem) moral evil in general, as distinct from ignorance or 
intellectual failure [cf. Sph.228d-e]. This is something quite different both from the rationalism of the 
earliest dialogues and from the puritanism of the Phaedo, and goes a good deal deeper than either; I take 
it to be Plato’s personal contribution”. Cf. Vlastos (1991), 45-80; Davidson (2005), 225-6; Rowe (2005), 
75-76; Penner/Rowe (2005), 222, note 41;  Rowe (2007b), 214, 223; Burnyeat (2006), 18: “This is the 
break with Socrates, whom I, like many others, take to be the awkward fellow envisaged at 438a as 
objecting that all desire is for what is good; even thirst, for example, being a desire, not just for drink, but 
for good drink or which is good (for me here and now)”. Contra Weiss (2007), 95: “Third — and most 
importantly — it is likely that the objector is not just anyone [or the intellectualistic Socrates] but is 
actually Glaucon, Socrates’ interlocutor”. Ibid., 98: “There is nothing in Socrates’ stand in the Gorgias 
or the Meno that is inconsistent with his stand in Rep. 4. In all three places people can desire  — and 
choose — anything that strikes them as good in some way”. 
10 Contra Penner (1990); cf. Carone (2001), 138: “…, his reason has been weakened and come to 
adopt the beliefs of the prevailing part”; Morris (2006), 219. n. 52; Brickhouse and Smith (2010), 202: 
“…, even in Plato’s divided psyche, each part of the soul (and each form of attraction, whether deriving 
from the rational, spirited, or appetitive parts) continues to be good-dependent, just as we find it to be in 
Socratic moral psychology”. Contra Brickhouse and Smith (2010), 210, I agree with Carone (2001), 
139-140, that the story of Leontios is not incompatible with the socratic denial of synchronic akrasia.  
11 So Burnyeat (2006), n. 14. 
12 So Burnyeat ( 2006), 11. 
13 Cf. also Weiss (2007). 
14 Cf. Frankfurt (1971). Cf. Ferber (2003a), 160-161; Lorenz (2006), 16. 
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chronic opposite opinions and synchronic opposite actions are not possible, it is, in the mo-
ment of action, a not clear-eyed synchronic, but diachronic akrasia. Leontios’ spirited part is 
aware of that what reason wants,15 although the knowledge of reason has been obscured by 
the appetite in the moment of action. The appetite is overcome by “the power of appearance” 
(hê tou phainomenou dynamis) (Prt.356d4), which causes just in this moment the pleasure to 
see pale youths to appear greater than it in the long run really is.  
It is also not this clear-eyed, synchronic and diabolic kind of akrasia which Augustine 
has described in the 2nd book of his Confessions when as a young boy he steals pears not 
because of appetite of pears but only because it is forbidden to steal pears (cf. Conf. II.6, 
14).16 This Augustinian example to do the bad not because of appetite for an apparent good, 
but only because it is bad and therefore not allowed seems to be the crucial counterexample 
for Socrates’ intellectualistic denial of (synchronic and clear-eyed) akrasia. But explained in 
the above-mentioned way, the story of Leontios can be put in accordance with the Socratic 
intellectualistic doctrine: Leontios is in error and does wrong unwillingly because he has a 
wrong opinion of the Good in the moment of doing it. In this sense, the literal translation of 
panta prattein can be put in accordance with the intellectualistic theory.  
In fact, the tripartite psychology is not rejected, but remembered also in the 6th book: 
“Do you remember when we distinguished three parts in the soul, in order to help bring out 
what justice, moderation, courage, and wisdom each is? — If I didn’t remember that, it 
wouldn’t be just for me to hear the rest” (R.504a4-8. Transl. Grube).17 If Glaucon remembers 
the theory of the tripartite soul, the platonic Socrates remembers it, too. The theory reappears 
in the 8th book (cf. R.553c-d) and in the 10th book (cf. R.588c-d) and the platonic Socrates 
alludes, with the words “ou gar hekôn hamartanei” (589c6), explicitly to the Socratic doctrine 
that nobody willingly does wrong (cf.R.591b) and speaks, for example, of the aphrosyne, that 
is in some sense the error, to choose the greatest tyranny (cf. R.619b). The Socratic doctrine 
that nobody does willingly wrong is reaffirmed again with modifications in the Phlb. 22b6-8, 
Ti.86d7-e3, and Leg.731c3-5.860d1-2. So we could say: Not only every simple soul, but also 
every tripartite soul, does everything for the good. Thus, the tripartite soul seems to me to be 
no hindrance for a unitary reading of Plato’s theory of human motivation, but rather a sup-
plement:  all three parts of the tripartite soul have some knowledge of the Good.18 Reason 
would pursue what is really good, “spirit what is admirable, appetite what is physically pleas-
urable”.19  
[S2] introduces the cognitive state of divining. Divining is a state of knowledge, but it is 
not mentioned in the divided line and seems to correspond to none of its states. It is not un-
conscious doxa, that is, eikasia or pistis, since it is conscious of its ignorance. It is evidently 
not noêsis, that is, dianoia or nous. The platonic Socrates has no noetic or dianoetic under-
standing of the idea of the Good, as he was not able in the Symposium “to behold [the divine 
Beauty in itself in its one form]” (Symp.212a1-2) “by that which he ought, …” (Smp.212a1-
2), for which organ of the soul, that is the nous, he does not yet have a name in the Sympo-
sium.20 The limits of knowledge of Socrates have already been indicated by Diotima, a fiction 
                                                             
15 Bobonich (2007a), 41-60, esp. 55-60. 
16 Conf. II.6,14: “Ecce est ille ‘servus fugiens dominum suum et consecutus umbram’. O putredo, o 
monstrum vitae et monstrum profunditatis! Potuitne libere quod non licebat, non ob aliud, nisi quia non 
licebat?” 
17 This point has been made by Sedley, forthcoming. 
18 This point has been made also by Moss (2008), 83-116, cf. 62: “Each part of the soul desires 
what it takes to be good, and therefore each person, no matter which part of her soul rules her, pursues 
things under the guise of the good in all her actions”. 
19 Burnyeat (2006), 15. Cf. EN. B3. 1104b30-35, quoted in Burnyeat (2006), 15.  
20 Cf. Bury (21932), 132. 
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of Plato perhaps invented to mark the limits of knowledge reached by his master 
(Smp.209e5-210a2).21 Here and not in the tripartition of the soul – which could be implied 
already in the Gorgias (cf.493a3-4) 22 – we may find the dividing line between the Socrates of 
the Meno, Protagoras, and Gorgias and the more platonic Socrates of the Phaedo and Repub-
lic. 
This divining describes a status between doxa and knowledge and is comparable to the 
activity of anamnêsis for embodied souls (cf. Men.86a6-8). It is a doxa conscious of its doxa-
stic character. Werner Jaeger has called attention to the fact that “presumably it was Plato 
who first took the notion of inner divination (manteuesthai), which the poets were already 
using in the sense of the presentiment of external events, and stamped it with the philosophi-
cal meaning of a divination not of the future but of deep and hidden attributes”.23 Surely 
“what every soul pursues and for what it does whatever it does” has “deep and hidden attrib-
utes” for the platonic Socrates in the Republic. As the remembering of ideas presupposes 
some knowledge of the ideas, so the apomanteuesthai of the idea of the Good presupposes 
some knowledge of the idea of the Good. But Socrates is neither willing nor able to give the 
logos tês ousias which he is demanding from the dialecticians (R.534b3). He compares his 
aneu epistêmês doxas (R.506c6) with the journey of a blind man (R.506b6-9). Nevertheless, 
the blind man is also a divining man and has a strong presumption in favour of the existence 
of what he is searching for. If “every soul” is divining that the Good is something (apoman-
teuomenê ti einai), also Socrates’ soul is divining that the Good is something. More exactly, 
he is making an existential and an essential claim about the Good. In sharper Aristotelian 
terms not used explicitly by Plato, we could say that the Good belongs to things like the 
Monas, where we already have a previous knowledge of both (1) the hoti esti and (2) its es-
sence and the ti esti (cf. An.post.71a11-16). This means that the idea of the Good is for Socra-
tes not a fictional entity like a “goat-stag” (tragelaphos) (cf. R.488a6. cf. An.prior.49a24. 
An.post.92b7). It is not something which does not exist or is a mê on. But the existential claim 
is for Socrates/Plato also a reality claim. This is especially the case because we are all realists 
concerning the Good, although we may be conventionalists concerning “the just and beautiful 
things” (dikaia men kai kala) (505d5): We want the real good in distinction to “the just and 
beautiful things” where we may be satisfied with the appearance. If the idea of the Good is 
happiness (cf. Smp.205a), we would not be satisfied with the appearance of happiness, but 
only with the real happiness. The Good is for Socrates/Plato therefore not, like happiness for 
Kant, an “ideal of imagination”.24 
[S3] affirms that every human soul is in a state of aporia concerning the final Good and is 
not able to capture its essence sufficiently. So there is an essence, but every soul and also 
Socrates’ soul cannot grasp it sufficiently. To be sure, the platonic Socrates has not only 
defended the principle of priority of definitional knowledge, but also the principle that we 
desire only the real, but not the apparent Good (cf. R.505d5-9). Nevertheless, he does not 
sufficiently know its essence. He knows sufficiently only that it is neither pleasure nor reason. 
It is here not to be completely excluded that the essence of the Good can be grasped suffi-
                                                             
21 Cf. Cornford (1950), 75: “I incline to agree with those scholars who have seen in this sentence 
Plato’s intention to mark the limit reached by the philosophy of his master”. But cf. also Bury (21932), 
125-126, and Ferber (2007b), 89-106. 
22 Slings (1994), 137, n. 33: “tês ... psychês touto en hôi epithumiai eisi. This implies the existence 
of to epithumêtikon; it certainly is much more definitive than the popular distinction between reason and 
impulse’ [Dodds, ad locum]”. But cf. also Brickhouse and Smith (2010), 143, n. 8: “…but he [Plato] 
nowhere in the early or Socratic dialogues explains what the various parts may be, nor does he in any 
way argue or attempt to explain precisely why the soul must have whatever parts it may have.” 
23 Jaeger (1948), 159, n. 1. For manteuesthai cf. R.506a6.523a8.531d5; Phlb.64a3.66e7-8. 
24 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 418 [transl. Paton (1948)]. 
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ciently by the philosopher kings and queens in the end. It is not a human impossibility in 
general, although — given the incarnated status of the imagined best philosophers (cf. 
R.498d.614a-621d) — this human possibility is hard to reconcile with the Socratic opinion in 
the Phaedo: “… for if it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one of 
two things is true: either we can never attain knowledge or we can do so after death” 
(Phd.66e5-6. Tr. Grube).25 But it is surely for Socrates an impossibility or a Socratic impossi-
bility. 
[S4] draws a consequence from this, based on the Socratic principle of the epistemologi-
cal priority of definitional knowledge. If “every soul” does not dispose of a definitional 
knowledge of the Good, she does not dispose of a stable opinion on other things. Of course, 
every soul may have changing opinions because our acting for the sake of the Good presup-
poses some value judgments, as even the case of Leontios shows. Socrates is alluding here to 
the Meno that there is a distinction between right opinion and knowledge and that knowledge 
stabilizes opinions (Men.98a6). But because we do not have sufficient knowledge of the Good 
but only insufficient, we do not acquire the sort of stable beliefs we have about other things. It 
is not clear what these other things are. They are probably the “just things and the others” 
(dikaia kai talla) (505a3), that is, the other virtues that “become useful and beneficial” 
(505a3-4) only by the knowledge of the Good. Because of the definitional priority of the 
definition of the real Good, the dikaia kai ta alla would just be dikaia but not really good. 
They would then be apparent dikaia.  
[S5] explicitly states this consequence: By ignoring the final Good, every soul would miss 
also the benefit she could take from the other things, probably the other virtues. Every soul 
would miss the real goodness or so to say “the real taste” of the other virtues or even of other 
apparent goods like pleasure and reason since it does not know the idea or the paradigm of the 
Good (cf. R.540a9). 
[S6] draws the consequence in the form of a rhetorical question: Will we allow the best 
people in the city, to whom we entrust everything, to be so in the dark about something of this 
kind and of this importance? “The best people” are the philosopher kings and queens. The 
best case of knowledge should be for the best of the city a real possibility. But here we have 
to distinguish two of “Plato’s philosophers” to use an expression of Donald Davidson26: Soc-
rates, Plato’s real philosopher in the Republic, and the philosopher king or queen, Plato’s 
imagined philosopher in the Republic. What is a Socratic impossibility is not a kingly or 
queenly impossibility. In the same vein, there are two best cases of knowledge concerning the 
ultimate Good: the Socratic one and the kingly or queenly one, the divining one and the 
knowing one. 
From these two states of knowledge, we have again to distinguish the platonic one, about 
which nobody knows anything with certainty. Maybe Plato’s state of knowledge was fluctuat-
ing between that of his real philosopher, Socrates, and that of his imagined philosopher king 
or queen in the Republic and came just “very near” (eggutata) (cf. R.473a8. Ep.VII.342d1-2) 
to the second one, that of the “most beautiful human being” (R.472d5). 
II. 
That every soul does everything for the sake of the Good sounds to Plato scholars very 
familiar. But it is in fact also very hard to understand and hard to accept. I mention two objec-
tions which have already been formulated in one of the best treatments we have on intentional 
action, that is, Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, Quaestio I (de ultimo fine hominis). 
                                                             
25 Cf. ad locum Chen (1992), but contra Ferber (2005), 167, n. 55.  
26 Davidson (2005). 
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Aquinas reassumes Aristotelian doctrines which go back to Plato’s Lysis and are presupposed 
also in the Republic, namely, that there is no infinite regress in final causes but a “first friend” 
(prôton philon) (cf. Lys.219c5-d2.220b6-7) or “one aim” (skopos) for the sake of which the 
future philosopher kings or queens have to do everything (hapanta prattein) they do in private 
or public life (R.519c2-4). 
First, the Good seems not that which every soul pursues and for which it does whatever it 
does. A man does “many things without deliberation, sometimes even without thinking about 
them, as when absently he makes a gesture or shifts his feet or rubs his chin” (ST, IaIIae, q. I, 
art. 1,3. Transl. Gilby).27 The answer is a distinction between “an act of man” (actio hominis) 
and “a human action” (actio humana) in the proper sense. Human actions  in the proper sense 
are actions of man insofar as he is man, that is, insofar as he is the master of what he does. 
Thus, we would have to reformulate the platonic thesis in the following way: Not every “act 
of man” (praxis anthrôpou), but only every deliberate act of man or every “human action” 
(anthrôpinê praxis) in the proper sense is done for the sake of the Good. This clarification 
was reached in principle also by Prichard in his famous inaugural lecture “Duty and Interest” 
(1928):  
“There is no escaping the conclusion that when Plato sets himself to consider not what 
should, but what actually does, as a matter of fact, lead a man to act when he is acting delib-
erately, and not merely in consequence of an impulse, he answers ‘The desire for some good 
to himself and that only’[ …]. In the Republic this view comes to light in the sixth book”.28  
We could add that the Good to himself is finally also the ultimate good or that the abso-
lute Good is also my good.29 
But against Prichard, I would also say that by acting like Leontios “merely in conse-
quence of an impulse” a man is acting by the desire for some good to himself. The acratic act 
of Leontios would then still be an anthrôpinê praxis and not only praxis anthrôpou. But it is a 
anthrôpinê praxis in which Leontios has given up his mastership of himself or an anthrôpinê 
praxis not in the proper but in the privative sense because the better knowledge of his reason 
concerning the good has been obscured and paralyzed in the moment of action by the “knowl-
edge” – that is erroneous doxa – of his passion.  
But evidently not only every praxis anthrôpou, but also not every anthrôpinê praxis is 
done for the sake of the ultimate Good. Just as in travelling to Tokyo, we do not take every 
step for the ultimate end that is Tokyo, so it is with the Good itself. Or, as Aquinas objects: 
“We are not expected always to be thinking of our last end whenever we desire or do some-
thing in particular” (ST, IaIIae, q. I, art. 6, 3. Transl. Gilby).30 But in the responsio to the 
objection, he replies that “the force of our first intention (vis primae intentionis) with respect 
to it persists in each desire of any other thing, even though it is not adverted to” (ST, IaIIae, q. 
I, art. 6. responsio 3. Transl. Gilby).31 The reasoning is this: If there were an unending chain 
of intentions for the sake of the Good, then we would not have any good. With this, he refers 
to Aristotle’s thesis “that to maintain an indefinite is to deny the nature of the good” 
(Metaph.994b12-13). If every intentional act were done for another intentional act, there 
would be no intentional act at all. But of course we don’t actually (actu) think always of the 
ultimate end or real Good if we think about a human action, just as we don’t think always of 
                                                             
27 “Sed multa homo agit absque deliberatione, de quibus etiam quandoque nihil cogitat; sicut cum 
aliquis movet pedem vel manum aliis intentus, vel fricat barbam”.  
28 Prichard (1999), 33. 
29 In this way already Demos (1939), 61: “Thus the good is both absolute and relative, both the 
good simpliciter and my good (Republic, 352e, 353a, b)”. 
30 “Sed non semper homo cogitat de ultimo fine in omni eo quod appetit aut facit”. 
31 “Sed virtus primae intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet appetitu cuju-
scumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non cogitetur”. 
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Tokyo if we are flying to Tokyo. We think of it only virtually, but we could think of it actu-
ally. Thus, the teaching of the platonic Socrates could be made more understandable if we 
presume that every soul is acting from a virtual intention to reach the final Good. We want 
virtually the final Good and if we take instead an apparent good, we act from ignorance of our 
real or first intention. 
Kant has said that we cannot act otherwise than “under the idea of freedom”.32 The pla-
tonic Socrates could have said that we cannot act otherwise than virtually under the idea of 
the Good. But in distinction to an idea in the Kantian sense to which no possible experience 
corresponds (cf. Critique of Pure Reason, A320/B377), the idea of the Good is, from the 
viewpoint of the “blind” Socrates, the object of divining and, from that of the  “seeing” phi-
losopher kings and queens, it is the object of a possible experience, that is, the object of an 
insight or understanding.  
III. 
 
But what is this final knowledge or what is it that we are finally searching for? Typologi-
cally, we may distinguish at least three substantive answers. First is the henological one, 
which goes back to Aristotle (Metaph.N4.1091b13-15.EE.A8.1218a18-20) and points to the 
neoplatonic one (cf. Plot.Enn.V.1.8.V.3.12-3.V.4.1.V.9.2.VI.7.37.VI.7.40). This interpreta-
tion was reassumed and defended by the Tubingen-Milano school.33 
Then we have the perfectionist answer put forward by Gerasimos Santas and others.34 
The form of the Good would be the ens perfectissimum, which is the cause of the essence and 
reality of the Forms in the sense that the Forms have their ideal attributes by participating in 
the Form of the Good.35 
And third, we have the structuralist answer put forward by Horace W.B. Joseph36 and re-
assumed by Terry Irwin, Justin C. B. Gosling, Gail Fine, and Gerhard Seel37 “that the form of 
the good is not a distinct form, but the teleological structure of forms; individual forms are its 
parts, and particular sensible objects instantiate it”.38 
But all these answers have in common that they are going beyond “Plato’s last word” in 
the Republic. From a purely exegetical point, this is a form in which — according to Richard 
Robinson — misunderstanding “is very common”.39 I do not say that these interpretations are 
therefore from a substantive point of view simply wrong. But the fact is that they are not 
shared unanimously and there is reasonable disagreement. In addition, all three substantive 
interpretations seem to most philosophers of today as they would have seemed to Aristotle, 
rather verbal or as a kind of kenologein (cf. Metaph.A9.991.a21-22). That is, we, or at least 
most of us, cannot connect these interpretations with the experience that the philosopher kings 
and queens must have when they see the Good or that Plato may have had. In addition, proba-
bly not only Glaucon but many other listeners and readers could not follow the omitted con-
tinuation of the story (cf. R.533a1). Who of us has spelled out the structural ordering or given 
the pollaplasioi logoi (R.534a8-9) of the eidê auta (R.510b8),40 under “the sovereignty of the 
Good”?41 And who has finally seen, that is understood, this Good or One. Perhaps Plato has 
                                                             
32 Kant, op. cit, AA 448.  
33 Cf. Krämer (1982); Reale  (201997); Szlezák (2001, 2002, 2003b). 
34 Santas (2002), 359-378. 
35 Cf. Santas, (1985, 2002, 2010), 137-142. 
36 Joseph (1948). 
37 Irwin (1977), 225; Gosling (1973); Fine (2003); Seel (2007). 
38 Fine (2003), 98. 
39 R. Robinson (1953), 1. 
40 Cf. Ferber (1989), 162-167. 
41 Cf. Murdoch (1997).  
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stretched the meaning of the expression “good” so much that it became too thin to be con-
nected with any personal experience for most of us.42  
He may have realized this in the Politicus where the Eleatic Stranger does not say any-
thing specific about “the demonstration of the exact itself” (hê peri auto takribes apodeixis) 
(Plt.284d1-2), that is (in my opinion), “the demonstration of the Good itself”, but lowers the 
standard by being satisfied for our immediate purpose with the introduction of “the coming 
into being of the appropriate” (hê tou metriou genesis) (Plt.284d6).43 This appropriate 
(metrion) is paraphrased as “the graceful (to prepon), the opportunity (ho kairos), the right (to 
deon)” and “all that has its seat in the middle between two extreme ends” (Plt.284e6-8). Of 
this “middle between two extreme ends” most people may have some experience and not only 
a divination.  
What can be said from a point of view of the last word in the Republic is only that the 
Good is a third item (triton) between and above knowledge and being — as the sun (and its 
product the light) is a third item between and above seeing and what is seen (cf. R.507d1.e1). 
With this third item, the substantive interpretations – henological, perfectionist, and struc-
turalist – are not in contradiction, although this formal “trialistic” interpretation does not 
satisfy any curiosity about “the deep and hidden attributes” of the Good “for what we are 
doing everything we do”.  
We have here a tension between the Socratic divining (apomanteuesthai) (R.505e1) and 
the kingly “knowing sufficiently” (gnôsesthai hikanôs) (R.506a7). The platonic Socrates, who 
has firm or even dianoia-like, that is, very examined opinions on other things, for example, 
that the just is happy44 — has only a doxa aneu epistêmês, that is, an unexamined doxa of that 
“what every soul pursues and for what it does whatever it does” (R.505d11-e2). But this is 
doxa which is aware of itself or remains a divining or apomanteuesthai. That this is the final 
answer of the platonic Socrates to the Socratic question “what in fact is the Good?” (… hoti 
pot’estin agathon) (Phlb.13e5-6) is confirmed by the latest published dialogue on the topic of 
the Good. What  the platonic Socrates claims to know in the Philebus concerning the absolute 
good (to pantapasin agathon) (Phlb.61a1-2) or “what in fact in man and in the universe is 
good by nature” (ti pote en t’anthrôpôi kai tôi panti pephyken agathon) (Phlb.64a1-2) is 
“what one should divine (manteuteon) is its form (tina idean autên einai)” (Phlb.64a2-4).  
 
                                                             
42 Cf. Demos (1939), 65: “It may be questioned whether Plato has not lost the Good by expanding 
its meaning”. 
43 Cf. Ferber (1995), 63-75. 
44 Cf. Ferber (2007b). 
